Africans are on the move, but leaving the continent remains rare
Trends and takeaways for African migration
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Earlier this week, Italy’s Giorgia Meloni hosted a summit on stopping irregular migration from Africa to Europe. Most of the headlines and discussion around African migration over the past several years have either been about such flows via boat from North Africa or about the potential for mass climate migration. As the demographically youngest continent in a world of aging states, many analysts expect that Africa will be the main source of the world’s future migrants. For those worried about shrinking labor forces that’s cause for celebration; for others worried about ethnic and racial make-up it’s cause for alarm. For example, while generally accepting of the 1 million Ukrainians who’ve entered their country since the Russian invasion, many vocal German politicians are looking to limit migration from outside the continent.
Despite attention to African migration, I assess that it will be many, many years (likely decades) before we see a spike in African mobility. Sure, there is mobility—within, to, and from the continent—but African migration remains rare (as migration does generally). There are about 31 million Africans living outside the country of their birth (out of 1.4 billion), and the vast majority are still on the continent. Of course, migration flows differ widely across the continent. I wrote in 8 Billion and Counting about the diversity in fertility and mortality trends among African states. The same is true about migration, as this snapshot of net migration by country shows.
A confluence of factors makes African migration dynamic: climate change, economic shifts, conflict, urbanization, COVID. That’s reflected in the bar chart when you see which countries are net senders and receivers for the year 2022, and when you look at annual net migration for preceding years. Africa accounts for only 14% of the world’s total migrant stock, while Asia accounts for 41% and Europe for 24%. Although Meloni and other European politicians are proposing economic development as a solution to stopping African migration to Europe, research shows that the poorest people in a society don’t move. As incomes rise across Africa we are likely to see more migration.
One important thing to remember: migration statistics are hard to capture. I don’t have a lot of faith in migration data for the continent, but still find it useful to zoom out and look at general patterns. To that end here are 4 key trends and 3 key takeaways for African migration today.
Key trend #1: Most African migration is inter-continental. While journalists will often cite surveys of Africans that demonstrate a strong desire to emigrate, “80 percent of African migrants do not have an interest in leaving the continent.”
Key trend #2: When it comes to economic migration, middle-income countries draw job seekers. South Africa is one, officially home to nearly 3 million migrants, or a bit less than 5% of the country’s total population, but likely home to many more unauthorized migrants. But South Africa, like many African states, experiences significant emigration and immigration simultaneously. That’s something the preceding bar chart on net migration doesn’t show.
Many White South Africans and Black professionals, both those from South Africa and those from other parts of Africa who had previously immigrated to South Africa, have emigrated, spurring worries over a brain drain.
Key trend #3: When it comes to migration from conflict, proximity matters. For example, in 2022, Uganda had the highest net exodus among African states (see preceding chart), but in 2021 they had the highest net influx. Uganda is one of the main hosts of displaced people in the region, so these numbers are largely driven by refugee flows; Uganda hosted 1.5 million refugees in 2022. As is common around the world, most refugees and asylum seekers on the African continent are hosted by neighboring countries within the region. That’s important to remember when projecting future migration patterns.
Key trend #4: Remittances continue to increase. On average for the continent, remittances dropped due to COVID, but only because of the 28% decline in remittances to Nigeria—if we remove that outlier, remittances actually increased by 6% during COVID. Migration should continue to increase over time and remittances along with it.
Key takeaway #1: Analyses projecting a vast increase in African emigration in the near future likely suffer from mobility bias.
I’ve written elsewhere about naming and checking our biases when it comes to demographic analysis (and this is one of the keynotes I offer to organizations trying to wisely use data). According to the African Youth Survey, half of the 4,500 young Africans surveyed wanted to leave the country because of a lack of educational and employment opportunities. But desires to migrate are a poor predictor of actual migration behavior. There is a tendency for researchers to suffer from “mobility bias.” They may overemphasize the drivers of migration, the push factors, without giving enough credence to the complex forces that keep people in place. Just as with making decisions about when or whether to have children, making decisions about when or whether to move is complicated. The existence of strong reasons for a person to leave is insufficient. Plus, as I explain in one of my favorite chapters from my book, migration is both a function of aspirations to migrate, and capabilities. Looking at migration drivers isn’t totally useless, though. Insecurity—particularly gang violence—is one to watch for countries like Nigeria, if experiences in Central America have taught us anything. We just shouldn’t draw inferences about future migration from drivers alone.
Key takeaway #2: We can’t project Africa’s future migration patterns unless we can project their economic growth. That’s hard.
To project what patterns future African migration will take we need to predict what will happen to homegrown economic opportunities, including which states or sub-regions will have the strongest economies. Economically, the African region has a long way to go. Intra-African trade is only 15% of total African trade, whereas it’s 60% of trade in Asia. That’s because of high tariffs and logistical challenges, particularly poor roads, which can add 75% to the price of African goods. In fact, moving goods in Africa costs 3 to 4 times more than the world average. Despite its large working-age population, Africa has yet to become the world’s manufacturing hub. And even when people move, there’s no guarantee they’ll find jobs. There is high unemployment in South Africa, even as it remains a top destination for regional immigrants.
Key takeaway #3: Projecting climate-induced migration is also hard. Sure, climate change will continue to drive emigration because of economic effects. Over 60% of sub-Saharan Africans are smallholder farmers, and when growing becomes more difficult but there are no economic opportunities at home, some will move, at least for part of the year. Yet, we also need to remember that mobility is intrinsic in some areas and cultures, and is an important adaptation to environmental changes.
In sum, even though there are a lot of unknowns when it comes to projecting migration, there are general patterns, so for those in the business of foresight, it’s not as if the future is a black box. Keeping these trends and takeaways in mind gives at least a more realistic sense of the future.
There have been some reports that Nigeria has experienced a much awaited and sizable fertility decline, from 5.3 children per woman in 2018 to now 4.6. But is it true? In a piece for the Wilson Center’s New Security Beat, Richard Cincotta raises doubts about the methodology and findings. He concludes, though, that Nigeria’s fertility rate may be somewhere in the neighborhood of 4.8 children per woman. If so, such a decline has been a long time coming. As one of only 8 countries in the world that still has a fertility rate above 5 children per woman on average, Nigeria’s demographic transition has been slow. But most political risk-watchers keep an eye on the future of Nigeria’s population because population, generally, is closely linked to national security and economic prosperity. As one of the most populous countries in the world, many have had high hopes that Nigeria can be an anchor of regional economic growth and stability. Such stability is difficult to achieve with an age structure as youthful as Nigeria’s. Nigeria’s fertility rate is declining, but how far, and how fast? As I’ve explained before, when we think about future declines we have to think about how leadership, policy, and economic conditions determine the pace of fertility declines. In Nigeria’s case, the low educational levels among women currently of childbearing age may be one reason for its slow transition thus far. Richard concludes that it’s best to wait until the results of the 2023 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) are out, and I concur.
The Africa Brief on Substack is a great source for uplifting and inspirational news coming out of Malawi. The contributors cover environmental topics, women and girls, human rights, and development. I find it a really great way to get a feel for what’s happening on the ground and diversify my news sources.
The newsletter has been on summer hiatus but with school starting back in just 2 weeks here the newsletter is back, too. Lots of great content coming to your inbox over the next few months so…
The bottom line is that Africa is likely to double its population in about 30 years. This will be disastrous for life on the continent, especially with ongoing climate change and political unrest. Ignoring Africa's overpopulation problem condemns life there, human and more-than-human to a truly dismal future, if any at all.